Identifying and Mitigating Exploitation of the Cisco ACE Application Control Engine Device Manager and Application Networking Manager Vulnerabilities
Advisory ID: cisco-amb-20090225-anm
http://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoAppliedMitigationBulletin/cisco-amb-20090225-anm
Revision 1.0
For Public Release 2009 February 25 16:00 UTC (GMT)
Related Resources: |  |  |
Contents
Cisco ResponseDevice-Specific Mitigation and Identification
Additional Information
Revision History
Cisco Security Procedures
Related Information
Cisco Response
This Applied Mitigation Bulletin is a companion document to the PSIRT Security Advisory Cisco ACE Application Control Engine Device Manager and Application Networking Manager Vulnerabilities and provides identification and mitigation techniques that administrators can deploy on Cisco network devices.
Vulnerability Characteristics
There are multiple vulnerabilities in the Cisco ACE Application Control Engine Device Manager (DM) and Cisco Application Networking Manager (ANM). The following subsections summarize two of these vulnerabilities that have a network mitigation.
The Cisco ANM MySQL server uses a default administrative password that could permit access to the MySQL database. This vulnerability could be exploited remotely with default credential authentication and without end-user interaction. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may allow remote unauthorized system access. Modification of Cisco ANM settings or the MySQL database may result in file modification, causing a denial of service (DoS) condition. The attack vector for exploitation is through TCP packets sent to TCP ports that are opened on systems running Cisco ANM.
This vulnerability has been assigned CVE identifier CVE-2009-0617.
The Cisco ANM Java agent contains a vulnerability that opens TCP ports on the Cisco ANM Server, which could permit administrative access to the Cisco ANM server. This vulnerability can be exploited remotely without authentication and without end-user interaction. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may allow an attacker to stop ANM processes, resulting in a DoS condition or information disclosure. Information disclosure enables an attacker to learn information about the affected device. The attack vector for exploitation is by way of TCP packets that are sent to TCP ports opened on the Cisco ANM Server.
This vulnerability has been assigned CVE identifier CVE-2009-0618.
Information about vulnerable, unaffected, and fixed software is available in the PSIRT Security Advisory, which is available at the following link: http://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-20090225-anm.
Mitigation Technique Overview
Cisco devices provide several countermeasures for this vulnerability. Administrators are advised to consider these protection methods to be general security best practices for infrastructure devices and the traffic that transits the network. This section of the document provides an overview of these techniques.
Cisco IOS Software can provide effective means of exploit prevention using transit access control lists (tACLs).
Effective exploit prevention can also be provided by the Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliance, the Cisco PIX 500 Series Security Appliance, and the Firewall Services Module (FWSM) for Cisco Catalyst 6500 Series switches and Cisco 7600 Series routers using tACLs.
These protection mechanisms filter and drop packets that may be attempting to exploit these vulnerabilities.
Effective use of Cisco Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) event actions provides visibility into and protection against attacks that attempt to exploit one of these vulnerabilities.
Cisco IOS NetFlow can provide visibility into network-based exploitation attempts using flow records.
Cisco IOS Software, Cisco ASA appliances, Cisco PIX security appliances, and FWSM firewalls can provide visibility through syslog messages and the counter values displayed in the output from show commands.
The Cisco Security Monitoring, Analysis, and Response System (Cisco Security MARS) appliance can also provide visibility through incidents, queries, and event reporting.
Risk Management
Organizations are advised to follow their standard risk evaluation and mitigation processes to determine the potential impact of this vulnerability. Triage refers to sorting projects and prioritizing efforts that are most likely to be successful. Cisco has provided documents that can help organizations develop a risk-based triage capability for their information security teams. Risk Triage for Security Vulnerability Announcements and Risk Triage and Prototyping can help organizations develop repeatable security evaluation and response processes.
Device-Specific Mitigation and Identification
Caution: The effectiveness of any mitigation technique depends on specific customer situations such as product mix, network topology, traffic behavior, and organizational mission. As with any configuration change, evaluate the impact of this configuration prior to applying the change.
- Cisco IOS Routers and Switches
- Cisco IOS NetFlow
- Cisco ASA, PIX, and FWSM Firewalls
- Cisco Intrusion Prevention System
- Cisco Security Monitoring, Analysis, and Response System
Cisco IOS Routers and Switches
Mitigation: Transit Access Control Lists
To protect the network from traffic that enters the network at ingress access points, which may include Internet connection points, partner and supplier connection points, or VPN connection points, administrators are advised to deploy transit access control lists (tACLs) to perform policy enforcement. Administrators can construct a tACL by explicitly permitting only authorized traffic to enter the network at ingress access points or permitting authorized traffic to transit the network in accordance with existing security policies and configurations. A tACL workaround cannot provide complete protection against this vulnerability when the attack originates from a trusted source address.
The tACL policy allows TCP and UDP packets from trusted sources to the affected Cisco ANM Server and its associated applications. Sources that are not listed as trusted are considered untrusted. TCP and UDP packets from untrusted sources are denied. In the following example, 192.168.60.0/24 is the IP address space that is used by the affected devices, and the host at 192.168.100.1 is considered a trusted source that requires access to the affected devices. Care should be taken to allow required traffic for routing and administrative access prior to denying all unauthorized traffic.
More specific access list entries can be created using the Application Networking Manager Ports Reference information in the User Guide for the Cisco Application Networking Manager 2.0. Other versions of Cisco ANM may have slightly different required services and ports, which can be determined by consulting the user guide for the appropriate version of Cisco ANM. Administrators who create more specific access list entries are advised to ensure that return traffic is allowed for connections initiated by the Cisco ANM and its associated applications.
Additional information about tACLs is in Transit Access Control Lists: Filtering at Your Edge.
!-- Include explicit permit statements for trusted sources !-- that require access to the Cisco ANM Server and !-- its associated applications ! !-- Permit TCP packets from trusted sources ! access-list 150 permit tcp host 192.168.100.1 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 ! !-- Permit UDP packets from trusted sources !-- UDP connections need to be allowed from trusted sources !-- to the Cisco ANM Server and its associated !-- applications for full functionality ! access-list 150 permit udp host 192.168.100.1 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 ! !-- The following vulnerability-specific access control entry !-- (ACE) can aid in identification of attacks ! access-list 150 deny tcp any 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 ! !-- Permit/deny all other Layer 3 and Layer 4 traffic in accordance !-- with existing security policies and configurations ! !-- Explicit deny for all other IP traffic ! access-list 150 deny ip any any ! !-- Apply tACL to interfaces in the ingress direction ! interface GigabitEthernet0/0 ip access-group 150 in
Note that filtering with an interface access list will elicit the transmission of ICMP unreachable messages back to the source of the filtered traffic. Generating these messages could have the undesired effect of increasing CPU utilization on the device. In Cisco IOS Software, ICMP unreachable generation is limited to one packet every 500 milliseconds by default. ICMP unreachable message generation can be disabled using the interface configuration command no ip unreachables. ICMP unreachable rate limiting can be changed from the default using the global configuration command ip icmp rate-limit unreachable interval-in-ms.
Identification: Transit Access Control Lists
After the administrator applies the tACL to an interface, the show ip access-lists command will identify the number of TCP packets that have been filtered. Administrators are advised to investigate filtered packets to determine whether they are attempts to exploit this vulnerability. Example output for show ip access-lists 150 follows:
router#show ip access-lists 150
Extended IP access list 150
10 permit tcp host 192.168.100.1 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 (11 matches)
20 permit udp host 192.168.100.1 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 (1115 matches)
30 deny tcp any 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 (129 matches)
40 deny ip any any
router#
In the preceding example, access list 150 has dropped 129 TCP packets for access control list entry (ACE) line 30.
For additional information about investigating incidents using ACE counters and syslog events, reference the Identifying Incidents Using Firewall and IOS Router Syslog Events Applied Intelligence white paper.
Administrators can use Embedded Event Manager to provide instrumentation when specific conditions are met, such as ACE counter hits. The Applied Intelligence white paper Embedded Event Manager in a Security Context provides additional details about how to use this feature.
Identification: Access List Logging
The log and log-input access control list (ACL) option will cause packets that match specific ACEs to be logged. The log-input option enables logging of the ingress interface in addition to the packet source and destination IP addresses and ports.
Caution: Access control list logging can be very CPU intensive and must be used with extreme caution. Factors that drive the CPU impact of ACL logging are log generation, log transmission, and process switching to forward packets that match log-enabled ACEs.
For Cisco IOS Software, the ip access-list logging interval interval-in-ms command can limit the effects of process switching induced by ACL logging. The logging rate-limit rate-per-second [except loglevel] command limits the impact of log generation and transmission.
The CPU impact from ACL logging can be addressed in hardware on the Cisco Catalyst 6500 Series switches and Cisco 7600 Series routers with Supervisor Engine 720 or Supervisor Engine 32 using optimized ACL logging.
For additional information about the configuration and use of ACL logging, reference the Understanding Access Control List Logging Applied Intelligence white paper.
Cisco IOS NetFlow
Identification: Traffic Flow Identification Using NetFlow Records
Administrators can configure Cisco IOS NetFlow on Cisco IOS routers and switches to aid in the identification of traffic flows that may be attempts to exploit the vulnerability. Administrators are advised to investigate flows to determine whether they are attempts to exploit the vulnerability or whether they are legitimate traffic flows.
router#show ip cache flow
IP packet size distribution (90784136 total packets):
1-32 64 96 128 160 192 224 256 288 320 352 384 416 448 480
.000 .698 .011 .001 .004 .005 .000 .004 .000 .000 .003 .000 .000 .000 .000
512 544 576 1024 1536 2048 2560 3072 3584 4096 4608
.000 .001 .256 .000 .010 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
IP Flow Switching Cache, 4456704 bytes
1885 active, 63651 inactive, 59960004 added
129803821 ager polls, 0 flow alloc failures
Active flows timeout in 30 minutes
Inactive flows timeout in 15 seconds
IP Sub Flow Cache, 402056 bytes
0 active, 16384 inactive, 0 added, 0 added to flow
0 alloc failures, 0 force free
1 chunk, 1 chunk added
last clearing of statistics never
Protocol Total Flows Packets Bytes Packets Active(Sec) Idle(Sec)
-------- Flows /Sec /Flow /Pkt /Sec /Flow /Flow
TCP-Telnet 11393421 2.8 1 48 3.1 0.0 1.4
TCP-FTP 236 0.0 12 66 0.0 1.8 4.8
TCP-FTPD 21 0.0 13726 1294 0.0 18.4 4.1
TCP-WWW 22282 0.0 21 1020 0.1 4.1 7.3
TCP-X 719 0.0 1 40 0.0 0.0 1.3
TCP-BGP 1 0.0 1 40 0.0 0.0 15.0
TCP-Frag 70399 0.0 1 688 0.0 0.0 22.7
TCP-other 26 0.0 150 40 0.0 0.0 15.5
UDP-DNS 582 0.0 4 73 0.0 3.4 15.4
UDP-NTP 287252 0.0 1 76 0.0 0.0 15.5
UDP-other 310347 0.0 2 230 0.1 0.6 15.9
ICMP 11674 0.0 3 61 0.0 19.8 15.5
IPv6INIP 15 0.0 1 1132 0.0 0.0 15.4
GRE 4 0.0 1 48 0.0 0.0 15.3
Total: 59957957 14.8 1 196 22.5 0.0 1.5
SrcIf SrcIPaddress DstIf DstIPaddress Pr SrcP DstP Pkts
Gi0/1 192.0.2.53 Gi0/0 192.168.60.52 06 0506 0CEA 496
Gi0/1 192.0.2.53 Gi0/0 192.168.60.52 06 0506 AD40 479
Gi0/0 192.168.10.201 Gi0/1 192.168.60.102 11 0984 00A1 1
Gi0/1 192.0.2.41 Gi0/0 192.168.60.72 06 058A AD3F 1
Gi0/1 192.0.2.186 Gi0/0 192.168.60.12 06 0989 C364 228
Gi0/1 192.0.2.2 Gi0/0 192.168.60.13 06 16DE 9C86 469
Gi0/0 10.89.16.226 Gi0/1 192.168.150.60 06 12CA 0016 1
Gi0/1 192.0.2.48 Gi0/0 192.168.60.71 06 0506 1F98 1
Gi0/1 192.0.2.89 Gi0/0 192.168.60.75 06 10E7 9DD1 121
Gi0/0 192.168.11.54 Gi0/1 192.168.60.158 11 0911 00A1 3
Gi0/1 192.0.2.2 Gi0/0 192.168.60.13 06 16DE EA63 473
Gi0/1 192.0.2.129 Gi0/0 192.168.60.74 06 096C 0694 1
Gi0/0 192.168.12.185 Gi0/1 192.168.60.239 11 0BD7 00A1 1
Gi0/1 192.0.2.129 Gi0/0 192.168.60.74 06 096C 2731 1
Gi0/0 192.168.10.17 Gi0/1 192.168.60.97 11 0B89 00A1 1
Gi0/1 192.0.2.101 Gi0/0 192.168.60.11 06 0718 A9B1 151
Gi0/1 192.0.2.213 Gi0/0 192.168.60.73 06 054A A570 1
Gi0/1 192.0.2.53 Gi0/0 192.168.60.52 06 0506 A564 477
Gi0/1 192.0.2.48 Gi0/0 192.168.60.71 06 0506 A56F 1
Gi0/1 192.168.150.60 Gi0/0 10.89.16.226 06 0016 12CA 1
Gi0/1 192.0.2.186 Gi0/0 192.168.60.12 06 0989 EA62 228
Gi0/1 192.0.2.101 Gi0/0 192.168.60.11 06 0718 157D 151
Gi0/1 192.0.2.213 Gi0/0 192.168.60.73 06 054A 0693 1
Gi0/1 192.0.2.186 Gi0/0 192.168.60.12 06 0989 9C72 228
Gi0/1 192.0.2.89 Gi0/0 192.168.60.75 06 10E7 A571 121
Gi0/1 192.0.2.101 Gi0/0 192.168.60.11 06 0718 C350 151
Gi0/0 192.168.13.97 Gi0/1 192.168.60.28 11 0B3E 00A1 5
Gi0/1 192.0.2.48 Gi0/0 192.168.60.71 06 0506 01BB 1
Gi0/1 192.0.2.129 Gi0/0 192.168.60.74 06 096C AD40 1
Gi0/0 10.88.226.1 Gi0/1 192.168.202.22 11 007B 007B 1
Gi0/1 192.0.2.213 Gi0/0 192.168.60.73 06 054A 2331 1
Gi0/1 192.0.2.41 Gi0/0 192.168.60.72 06 058A 0202 1
Gi0/1 192.0.2.89 Gi0/0 192.168.60.75 06 10E7 06CD 121
Gi0/1 192.0.2.48 Null 192.168.0.5 06 0506 01BB 1
Gi0/1 192.0.2.48 Null 192.168.0.6 06 0506 01BB 1
Gi0/1 192.0.2.48 Null 192.168.0.3 06 0506 01BB 1
Gi0/1 192.0.2.48 Null 192.168.0.4 06 0506 01BB 1
Gi0/1 192.0.2.48 Null 192.168.0.1 06 0506 01BB 1
Gi0/1 192.0.2.48 Null 192.168.0.2 06 0506 01BB 1
Gi0/1 192.0.2.48 Null 192.168.0.9 06 0506 01BB 1
Gi0/1 192.0.2.48 Null 192.168.0.7 06 0506 01BB 1
Gi0/1 192.0.2.48 Null 192.168.0.8 06 0506 01BB 1
router#
In the preceding example, there are multiple flows for TCP packets that are sent to the 192.168.60.0 address block.
To view only the traffic flows for TCP packets sent to the 192.168.60.0 address block, the command show ip cache flow | include SrcIf|192\.168\.60\..+_06_ will display the related TCP NetFlow records as shown here.
router#show ip cache flow | include SrcIf|192\.168\.60\..+_06_ SrcIf SrcIPaddress DstIf DstIPaddress Pr SrcP DstP Pkts Gi0/1 192.0.2.53 Gi0/0 192.168.60.52 06 0506 0CEA 493 Gi0/1 192.0.2.53 Gi0/0 192.168.60.52 06 0506 AD40 486 Gi0/1 192.0.2.41 Gi0/0 192.168.60.72 06 058A AD3F 1 Gi0/1 192.0.2.186 Gi0/0 192.168.60.12 06 0989 C364 228 Gi0/1 192.0.2.2 Gi0/0 192.168.60.13 06 16DE 9C86 470 Gi0/1 192.0.2.48 Gi0/0 192.168.60.71 06 0506 1F98 1 Gi0/1 192.0.2.89 Gi0/0 192.168.60.75 06 10E7 9DD1 121 Gi0/1 192.0.2.2 Gi0/0 192.168.60.13 06 16DE EA63 475 Gi0/1 192.0.2.129 Gi0/0 192.168.60.74 06 096C 0694 1 Gi0/1 192.0.2.129 Gi0/0 192.168.60.74 06 096C 2731 1 Gi0/1 192.0.2.101 Gi0/0 192.168.60.11 06 0718 A9B1 151 Gi0/1 192.0.2.213 Gi0/0 192.168.60.73 06 054A A570 1 Gi0/1 192.0.2.53 Gi0/0 192.168.60.52 06 0506 A564 485 Gi0/1 192.0.2.48 Gi0/0 192.168.60.71 06 0506 A56F 1 Gi0/1 192.0.2.186 Gi0/0 192.168.60.12 06 0989 EA62 228 Gi0/1 192.0.2.101 Gi0/0 192.168.60.11 06 0718 157D 151 Gi0/1 192.0.2.213 Gi0/0 192.168.60.73 06 054A 0693 1 Gi0/1 192.0.2.186 Gi0/0 192.168.60.12 06 0989 9C72 228 Gi0/1 192.0.2.89 Gi0/0 192.168.60.75 06 10E7 A571 121 Gi0/1 192.0.2.101 Gi0/0 192.168.60.11 06 0718 C350 151 Gi0/1 192.0.2.48 Gi0/0 192.168.60.71 06 0506 01BB 1 Gi0/1 192.0.2.129 Gi0/0 192.168.60.74 06 096C AD40 1 router#
Cisco ASA, PIX, and FWSM Firewalls
Mitigation: Transit Access Control Lists
To protect the network from traffic that enters the network at ingress access points, which may include Internet connection points, partner and supplier connection points, or VPN connection points, administrators are advised to deploy tACLs to perform policy enforcement. Administrators can construct a tACL by explicitly permitting only authorized traffic to enter the network at ingress access points or permitting authorized traffic to transit the network in accordance with existing security policies and configurations. A tACL workaround cannot provide complete protection against this vulnerability when the attack originates from a trusted source address.
The tACL policy allows TCP and UDP connections from trusted sources to the affected Cisco ANM Server and its associated applications. Sources that are not listed as trusted are considered untrusted. TCP and UDP connections from untrusted sources are denied. In the following example, 192.168.60.0/24 is the IP address space that is used by the affected devices, and the host at 192.168.100.1 is considered a trusted source that requires access to the affected devices. Care should be taken to allow required traffic for routing and administrative access prior to denying all unauthorized traffic.
More specific access list entries can be created using the Application Networking Manager Ports Reference information in the User Guide for the Cisco Application Networking Manager 2.0. Other versions of Cisco ANM may have slightly different required services and ports, which can be determined by consulting the user guide for the appropriate version of Cisco ANM. Administrators who create more specific access list entries are advised to ensure that return traffic is allowed for connections initiated by the Cisco ANM and its associated applications.
Additional information about tACLs is in Transit Access Control Lists: Filtering at Your Edge.
!-- Include explicit permit statements for trusted sources !-- that require access to the Cisco ANM Server and !-- its associated applications ! !-- Permit TCP packets from trusted sources ! access-list tACL-Policy extended permit tcp host 192.168.100.1 192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0 ! !-- Permit UDP packets from trusted sources !-- UDP connections need to be allowed from trusted sources !-- to the Cisco ANM Server and its associated !-- applications for full functionality ! access-list tACL-Policy extended permit udp host 192.168.100.1 192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0 ! !-- The following vulnerability-specific access control entry !-- (ACE) can aid in identification of attacks ! access-list tACL-Policy extended deny tcp any 192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0 ! !-- Permit/deny all other Layer 3 and Layer 4 traffic in accordance !-- with existing security policies and configurations ! !-- Explicit deny for all other IP traffic ! access-list tACL-Policy extended deny ip any any ! !-- Apply tACL to interface(s) in the ingress direction ! access-group tACL-Policy in interface outside
Identification: Transit Access Control Lists
After the tACL has been applied to an interface, administrators can use the show access-list command to identify the number of TCP packets that have been filtered. Administrators are advised to investigate filtered packets to determine whether they are attempts to exploit this vulnerability. Example output for show access-list tACL-Policy follows:
firewall#show access-list tACL-Policy access-list tACL-Policy; 4 elements access-list tACL-Policy line 1 extended permit tcp host 192.168.100.1 192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0 (hitcnt=213) access-list tACL-Policy line 2 extended permit udp host 192.168.100.1 192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0 (hitcnt=37) access-list tACL-Policy line 3 extended deny tcp any 192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0 (hitcnt=152) access-list tACL-Policy line 4 extended deny ip any any (hitcnt=0) firewall#
In the preceding example, access list tACL-Policy has dropped 152 TCP packets received from an untrusted host or network. In addition, syslog message 106023 can provide valuable information, which includes the source and destination IP address, the source and destination port numbers, and the IP protocol for the denied packet.
Identification: Firewall Access List Syslog Messages
Firewall syslog message 106023 will be generated for packets denied by an access control entry (ACE) that does not have the log keyword present. Additional information about this syslog message is in Cisco Security Appliance System Log Message - 106023.
Information about configuring syslog for the Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliance or the Cisco PIX 500 Series Security Appliance is in Monitoring the Security Appliance - Configuring and Managing Logs. Information about configuring syslog on the FWSM for Cisco Catalyst 6500 Series switches and Cisco 7600 Series routers is in Monitoring the Firewall Services Module.
In the following example, the show logging | grep regex command extracts syslog messages from the logging buffer on the firewall. These messages provide additional information about denied packets that could indicate potential attempts to exploit the vulnerability that is described in this document. It is possible to use different regular expressions with the grep keyword to search for specific data in the logged messages.
Additional information about regular expression syntax is in Creating a Regular Expression.
firewall#show logging | grep 106023
Feb 25 2009 00:15:13: %ASA-4-106023: Deny tcp src outside:192.0.2.18/2944
dst inside:192.168.60.191/443 by access-group "tACL-Policy"
Feb 25 2009 00:15:13: %ASA-4-106023: Deny tcp src outside:192.2.0.200/2945
dst inside:192.168.60.33/514 by access-group "tACL-Policy"
Feb 25 2009 00:15:13: %ASA-4-106023: Deny tcp src outside:192.0.2.99/2946
dst inside:192.168.60.240/1683 by access-group "tACL-Policy"
Feb 25 2009 00:15:13: %ASA-4-106023: Deny tcp src outside:192.0.2.100/2947
dst inside:192.168.60.115/1684 by access-group "tACL-Policy"
Feb 25 2009 00:15:13: %ASA-4-106023: Deny tcp src outside:192.0.2.88/2949
dst inside:192.168.60.38/1741 by access-group "tACL-Policy"
Feb 25 2009 00:15:13: %ASA-4-106023: Deny tcp src outside:192.0.2.175/2950
dst inside:192.168.60.250/3306 by access-group "tACL-Policy"
firewall#
In the preceding example, the messages logged for the tACL tACL-Policy show TCP packets sent to the address block are assigned to affected devices.
Additional information about syslog messages for ASA and PIX security appliances is in Cisco Security Appliance System Log Messages. Additional information about syslog messages for the FWSM is in Catalyst 6500 Series Switch and Cisco 7600 Series Router Firewall Services Module Logging System Log Messages.
For additional information about investigating incidents using syslog events, reference the Identifying Incidents Using Firewall and IOS Router Syslog Events Applied Intelligence white paper.
Cisco Intrusion Prevention System
Mitigation: Cisco IPS Signature Event Actions
Administrators can use Cisco Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) appliances and services modules to provide threat detection and help prevent attempts to exploit one of these vulnerabilities. Beginning with signature update S384 for sensors running Cisco IPS version 6.x or 5.x, one of these vulnerabilities can be detected by signature 15493/0 (Signature Name: Cisco ANM Java Agent Privilege Escalation). Signature 15493/0 is enabled by default, triggers a Medium severity event, has a signature fidelity rating (SFR) of 85, and is configured with a default event action of Produce Alert.
This signature fires upon detecting an attempt to exploit the Java Agent Privilege Escalation vulnerability in Cisco Application Networking Manager (ANM). Firing of this signature may indicate a potential exploit of this vulnerability.
Administrators can configure Cisco IPS sensors to perform an event action when an attack is detected. The configured event action performs preventive or deterrent controls to help protect against an attack that is attempting to exploit the vulnerabilities that are described in this document.
Cisco IPS sensors are most effective when deployed in inline protection mode combined with the use of an event action. Automatic Threat Prevention for Cisco IPS 6.x sensors that are deployed in inline protection mode provides threat prevention against an attack that is attempting to exploit the vulnerabilities that are described in this document. Threat prevention is achieved through a default override that performs an event action for triggered signatures with a riskRatingValue greater than 90.
Cisco IPS 5.x sensors that are deployed in inline protection mode require an event action configured on a per-signature basis. Alternatively, administrators can configure an override that can perform an event action for any signatures that are triggered and are calculated as a high-risk threat. Using an event action on sensors deployed in inline protection mode provides the most effective exploit prevention.
For additional information about the risk rating and threat rating calculation, reference Risk Rating and Threat Rating: Simplify IPS Policy Management
Cisco Security Monitoring, Analysis, and Response System
Identification: Cisco Security Monitoring, Analysis, and Response System Incidents
The Cisco Security Monitoring, Analysis, and Response System (Cisco Security MARS) appliance can create incidents regarding events that are related to the vulnerabilities that are described in this document using IPS signature 15493/0 (Signature Name: Cisco ANM Java Agent Privilege Escalation). After the S384 dynamic signature update has been downloaded, using keyword NR-15493 for IPS signature 15493/0 and a query type of All Matching Event Raw Messages on the Cisco Security MARS appliance will provide a report that lists the incidents created by the IPS signature.
Beginning with the 4.3.1 and 5.3.1 releases of Cisco Security MARS appliances, support for the Cisco IPS dynamic signature updates feature has been added. This feature downloads new signatures from Cisco.com or from a local web server, correctly processes and categorizes received events that match those signatures, and includes them in inspection rules and reports. These updates provide event normalization and event group mapping, and they also enable the MARS appliance to parse new signatures from the IPS devices.
Caution: If dynamic signature updates are not configured, events that match these new signatures appear as unknown event type in queries and reports. Because MARS will not include these events in inspection rules, incidents may not be created for potential threats or attacks that occur within the network.
By default, this feature is enabled but requires configuration. If it is not configured, the following Cisco Security MARS rule will be triggered:
System Rule: CS-MARS IPS Signature Update Failure
When this feature is enabled and configured, administrators can determine the current signature version downloaded by MARS by selecting Help > About and reviewing the IPS Signature Version value.
Additional information about dynamic signature updates and instructions for configuring dynamic signature updates are available for the Cisco Security MARS 4.3.1 and 5.3.1 releases.
Additional Information
THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME.
Revision History
|
Revision 1.0 |
2009-February-25 |
Initial public release |
Cisco Security Procedures
Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering to receive security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/psirt/security_vulnerability_policy.html. This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt.
Related Information
- Cisco Applied Mitigation Bulletins
- Cisco Security Center
- Cisco IOS NetFlow - Home Page on Cisco.com
- Cisco IOS NetFlow White Papers
- NetFlow Performance Analysis
- Cisco Network Foundation Protection White Papers
- Cisco Network Foundation Protection Presentations
- A Security-Oriented Approach to IP Addressing
- Cisco Firewall Products - Home Page on Cisco.com
- Cisco 6.x Intrusion Prevention System
- Cisco IPS 6.x Signature Downloads (registered customers only)
- Cisco IPS Signature Search Page
- Cisco Security Monitoring, Analysis, and Response System
- Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE)
