Cisco Security Advisory
Cisco IOS DHCP Blocked Interface Denial-of-Service
-
Cisco IOSŪ devices running branches of Cisco IOS version 12.2S that have Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) server or relay agent enabled, even if not configured, are vulnerable to a denial of service where the input queue becomes blocked when receiving specifically crafted DHCP packets. Cisco is providing free fixed software to address this issue. There are also workarounds to mitigate this vulnerability. This issue was introduced by the fix included in CSCdx46180 and is being tracked by Cisco Bug ID CSCee50294 ( registered customers only) .
This advisory is available at https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-20041110-dhcp.
-
This vulnerability was introduced by the fix for CSCdx46180, and was integrated in Cisco IOS 12.2(14)SZ and 12.2(18)S.
Vulnerable Products
The following Cisco products running Cisco IOS version 12.2(14)SZ, or a variant of Cisco IOS 12.2(18)S (as listed in the following section) and higher are affected by this vulnerability.
-
Cisco 7200, 7300, 7500 platforms
-
Cisco 2650, 2651, 2650XM, 2651XM Multiservice platform
-
Cisco ONS15530, ONS15540
-
Cisco Catalyst 4000, Sup2plus, Sup3, Sup4 and Sup5 modules
-
Cisco Catalyst 4500, Sup2Plus TS
-
Cisco Catalyst 4948, 2970, 3560, and 3750
-
Cisco Catalyst 6000, Sup2/MSFC2 and Sup720/MSFC3
-
Cisco 7600 Sup2/MSFC2 and Sup720/MSFC3
This issue affects only Cisco devices running affected Cisco IOS versions 12.2(18)EW, 12.2(18)EWA, 12.2(14)SZ, 12.2(18)S, 12.2(18)SE, 12.2(18)SV, 12.2(18)SW and higher that do not have the configuration command no service dhcp. It is not necessary for DHCP server or relay agent to be configured in order for this vulnerability to be present and exploited; "service dhcp" is enabled by default in IOS and is the only setting necessary (in addition to interface addresses) for exploitation of this vulnerability. This includes routers as well as switches and line cards which run Cisco IOS software. Cisco devices which do not run Cisco IOS software are not affected. Cisco devices running affected Cisco IOS software with the command no service dhcp enabled are not affected.
To determine the software running on a Cisco product, log in to the device and issue the show version command to display the system banner. Cisco IOS software will identify itself as "Internetwork Operating System Software" or simply "IOSŪ." On the next line of output, the image name will be displayed between parentheses, followed by "Version" and the IOS release name. Other Cisco devices will not have the show version command or will give different output.
The following example identifies a Cisco product running IOS release 12.0(3) with an installed image name of C2500-IS-L:
Cisco Internetwork Operating System Software IOS (TM) 2500 Software (C2500-IS-L), Version 12.0(3), RELEASE SOFTWARE
The release train label is "12.0."
The next example shows a product running Cisco IOS release 12.0(2a)T1 with an image name of C2600-JS-MZ:
Cisco Internetwork Operating System Software IOS (tm) C2600 Software (C2600-JS-MZ), Version 12.0(2a)T1, RELEASE SOFTWARE (fc1)
Additional information about Cisco IOS release naming can be found at http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/620/1.html.
Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable
Cisco devices running affected Cisco IOS software with the command no service dhcp enabled are not affected.
Cisco products that run any versions of IOS not listed in the Software Versions and Fixes table below, are not affected.
Cisco products that do not run Cisco IOS software and are not affected by this vulnerability include, but are not limited to:
-
700 series dialup routers (750, 760, and 770 series) are not
affected.
-
WAN switching products such as the IGX, BPX and MGX lines are not
affected.
-
No host-based software is affected.
-
The Cisco PIX Firewall is not affected
-
The Cisco LocalDirector is not affected.
-
The Cisco Content Engine and ACNS is not affected.
-
The Catalyst 2901/2902, 2948G, 2980G, 4000, 5000, and 6000 switches
running CatOS.
-
Cisco Network Registrar is not affected.
-
Cisco VPN 3000 series is not affected
-
Cisco IOS-XR platform is not affected.
-
Cisco MDS 9000 family is not affected.
-
Cisco 7200, 7300, 7500 platforms
-
DHCP services allow devices to request and receive basic host configuration information from the DHCP server via the network. Cisco routers can be configured to both provide dynamic host configuration information (termed DHCP server function), and forward DHCP and BootP packets across separate broadcast domains (termed DHCP relay agent function). Cisco routers are configured to process and accept DHCP packets by default, therefore the command service dhcp does not appear in the running configuration display, and only the command for the disabled feature, no service dhcp, will appear in the running configuration display when the feature is disabled. The vulnerability is present, regardless if the DHCP server or relay agent configurations are present on an affected product. The only required configuration for this vulnerability in affected versions is the lack of the no service dhcp command. Certain crafted DHCP packets may be undeliverable, but will remain in the queue instead of being dropped. If a number of packets are sent that equal the size of the input queue, no more traffic will be accepted on that interface.
On a blocked Ethernet interface, Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) times out after a default time of four hours, and no inbound or outbound traffic can be processed, including both IP and non-IP traffic such as IPX. The device must be rebooted to clear the input queue on the interface, and will not reload without user intervention. The attack may be repeated on all interfaces, causing the router to be remotely inaccessible, excluding the console port where DHCP packets are not processed by default and which can be used for out-of-band management and configured for remote access. Workarounds are available, and are documented in the Workarounds section below. Other types of interfaces, including but not limited to ATM, Serial and POS interfaces, are affected, but ARP is not a factor.
To identify a blocked input interface, use the show interfaces command and look for the Input Queue line. The size of the input queue may keep increasing. If the current size (in this case, 76) is larger than the maximum size (75), the input queue is blocked.
Router#show interface ethernet 0/0 Ethernet0/0 is up, line protocol is up Hardware is AmdP2, address is 0050.500e.f1e0 (bia 0050.500e.f1e0) Internet address is 172.16.1.9/24 MTU 1500 bytes, BW 10000 Kbit, DLY 1000 usec, rely 255/255, load 1/255 Encapsulation ARPA, loopback not set, keepalive set (10 sec) ARP type: ARPA, ARP Timeout 04:00:00 Last input 00:00:41, output 00:00:07, output hang never Last clearing of "show interface" counters 00:07:18 Input queue: 76/75/1091/0 (size/max/drops/flushes); Total output drops: 0 !--- The 76/75 shows that this is blocked
-
There are four possible workarounds for this vulnerability:
-
Disabling the dhcp service
-
Control Plane Policing
-
Two versions of Access Control Lists
The effectiveness of any workaround is dependent on specific customer situations such as product mix, network topology, traffic behavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected products and releases, customers should consult with their service provider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it is deployed.
Disabling the DHCP Service
This vulnerability can be mitigated by utilizing the command:
no service dhcp
However, this workaround will disable all DHCP processing on the device, including the DHCP helper functionality that may be necessary in some network configurations.
Control Plane Policing Feature
The Control Plane Policy feature may be used to mitigate this vulnerability, as in the following example:
access-list 140 deny udp host 192.168.13.1 any eq bootps access-list 140 deny udp any host 192.168.13.1 eq bootps access-list 140 deny udp any host 255.255.255.255 eq bootps access-list 140 permit udp any any eq bootps class-map match-all bootps-class match access-group 140 policy-map control-plane-policy class bootps-class police 8000 1500 1500 conform-action drop exceed-action drop control-plane service-policy input control-plane-policyFor this example 192.168.13.1 is a legitimate DHCP server.
Additional information on the configuration and use of the CPP feature can be found at this link:
This workaround is only applicable to Cisco IOS 12.2S, as this feature is only available in Cisco IOS versions 12.2S and 12.3T. Cisco IOS 12.3T is not impacted by this advisory.
Access Lists - Two Methods
Access lists can be applied to block DHCP/BootP traffic destined to any router interface addresses, as in the following example:
In this example, the IP address192.168.13.1 represents a legitimate DHCP server, the addresses 10.89.236.147 and 192.168.13.2 represent router interface addresses, and 192.168.61.1 represents a loopback interface on the router.
In this example, any bootp/dhcp packets destined to the router interface addresses are blocked.
access-list 100 remark permit bootps from the DHCP server access-list 100 permit udp host 192.168.13.1 any eq bootps access-list 100 remark deny bootps from any to router f1/0 access-list 100 deny udp any host 10.89.236.147 eq bootps access-list 100 remark deny bootps from any to router f0/0 access-list 100 deny udp any host 192.168.13.2 eq bootps access-list 100 remark deny bootps from any to router loopback1 access-list 100 deny udp any host 192.168.61.1 eq bootps access-list 100 remark permit all other traffic access-list 100 permit ip any any
access-list 100 is applied to f0/0 and f1/0 physical interfaces.
interface FastEthernet0/0 ip address 192.168.13.2 255.255.255.0 ip access-group 100 in interface FastEthernet1/0 ip address 10.89.236.147 255.255.255.240 ip access-group 100 in ip helper-address 192.168.13.1
An alternate configuration for the interface access-list workaround.
This example would also need to be applied to all physical interfaces, but deny statements for all of the IP addresses configured on the router are not necessary in this approach. In this example, the address 192.168.13.1 represents a legitimate DHCP server.
access-list 100 permit udp host 192.168.13.1 any eq bootps access-list 100 permit udp any host 192.168.13.1 eq bootps access-list 100 permit udp any host 255.255.255.255 eq bootps access-list 100 deny udp any any eq bootps interface FastEthernet0/0 ip address 192.168.13.2 255.255.255.0 ip access-group 100 in interface FastEthernet1/0 ip address 10.89.236.147 255.255.255.240 ip access-group 100 in ip helper-address 192.168.13.1
Note: These workarounds will not prevent spoofed IP packets with the source IP address set to that of the DHCP server
For more information on anti-spoofing refer to http://www.cisco.com/en/US/tech/tk648/tk361/technologies_tech_note09186a0080120f 48.shtml#sec_ip and http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2827.txt
. The Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding (Unicast RPF) feature helps to mitigate problems that are caused by spoofed IP source addresses. For further details, please refer to http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/ios/12_2/security/configuration/guide/scfrpf.html.
-
Disabling the dhcp service
-
Each row of the Cisco IOS software table below describes a release train and the platforms or products for which it is intended. If a given release train is vulnerable, then the earliest possible releases that contain the fix (the "First Fixed Release") and the anticipated date of availability for each are listed in the "Rebuild" and "Maintenance" columns. A device running a release in the given train that is earlier than the release in a specific column (less than the First Fixed Release) is known to be vulnerable. The release should be upgraded at least to the indicated release or a later version (greater than or equal to the First Fixed Release label). When selecting a release, keep in mind the following definitions:
-
Maintenance: Most heavily tested, stable, and highly recommended
release of a release train in any given row of the table.
-
Rebuild: Constructed from the previous maintenance or major release
in the same train, it contains the fix for a specific defect. Although it
receives less testing, it contains only the minimal changes necessary to repair
the vulnerability.
In all cases, customers should exercise caution to confirm that the devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported properly by the new software release. If the information is not clear, contact the Cisco TAC for assistance as shown in the Obtaining Fixed Software section below.
More information on Cisco IOS software release names and abbreviations is available at http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/620/1.html.
The fixes will be available at the Software Center located at http://www.cisco.com/tacpage/sw-center/.
For software installation and upgrade procedures, see http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/130/upgrade_index.shtml.
For a current view of all posted and repaired images for Cisco IOS, please check the listing available to registered Cisco.com users at: https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/support/downloads/go/Redirect.x?mdfid=268438303 ( registered customers only) .
Major Release
Availability of Repaired Releases
Affected 12.2-Based Release
Rebuild
Maintenance
12.2(18)EW
12.2(18)EW2
12.2(20)EW
Migrates to 12.2(20)EWA
12.2(18)EWA
12.2(20)EWA
12.2(18)S
12.2(18)S6
12.2(20)S4
12.2(22)S2
12.2(25)S
12.2(18)SE
12.2(20)SE3
12.2(18)SV
12.2(24)SV
12.2(18)SW
12.2(25)SW
12.2(18)SXD
Not impacted
12.2(14)SZ
Migrates to 12.2(20)S4
-
Maintenance: Most heavily tested, stable, and highly recommended
release of a release train in any given row of the table.
-
The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious use of the vulnerability described in this advisory.
This vulnerability was reported to Cisco by a customer.
-
To learn about Cisco security vulnerability disclosure policies and publications, see the Security Vulnerability Policy. This document also contains instructions for obtaining fixed software and receiving security vulnerability information from Cisco.
-
Show Less
Revision 1.2
2004-December-1
Updated Software version table - 12.2(20)EW.
Revision 1.1
2004-November-10
Added network review disclaimer text to Workaround section.
Revision 1.0
2004-November-10
Initial public release.
-
THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME.
A stand-alone copy or paraphrase of the text of this document that omits the distribution URL is an uncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain factual errors. The information in this document is intended for end-users of Cisco products.